If God knows what we will do before we do it, and if God can't be wrong, then how could we possibly be free? And if we're not free in our actions, how could God justly hold us responsible on Judgment Day? This is the problem of divine omniscience and human free will.
Here's an argument I often hear for the conclusion that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will:
(1) Necessarily, if God believes p, then p is true. (from the definition of "omniscience")
(2) God believes that I will eat cereal tomorrow. (stipulated)
(3) Therefore, I must eat cereal tomorrow.
And it's plausible that if I must eat cereal, then I'm not free with respect to that action. So it looks like God's omniscience is incompatible with free will.
However, I think that all that really follows from (1) and (2) is this:
(4) Therefore, I will eat cereal tomorrow.
Here's an example to help you see why (3) doesn't follow.
You can take "necessarily" to mean "in every possibility," or "in every possible world," or "in every possible scenario." So in premise (1) we're looking over the possibilities and saying that in all of them, some proposition is true (namely, that if God believes p, p is true).
Consider a case in which we look over something less abstract, say countries. We can consider the laws in every country on Earth, and say stuff like "In every country C, if you murder someone in C, you go to jail in C." So if you murder someone in Mexico, you go to jail in Mexico. If you murder someone in Turkey, you go to jail in Turkey. And so on.
Call that premise (1*):
(1*) In every country C, if you murder someone in C, you go to jail in C.
Now suppose that the following is true:
(2*) You murder someone in Iceland.
What follows from (1*) and (2*)? Is it this?
(3*) You go to jail in every country.
Of course not. That's absurd. All that follows from (1*) and (2*) is this:
(4*) You go to jail in Iceland.
But the absurd inference from (1*)&(2*) to (3*) is perfectly analogous to the inference from (1)&(2) to (3) above. Consider that inference again (I'll change the wording to make it more clearly analogous while preserving the meaning):
(1) In every possible world, if God believes p, then p is true.
(2) God believes that I will eat cereal tomorrow in the actual world.
(3) Therefore, I eat cereal tomorrow in every possible world.
But clearly (3) doesn't follow, just as it didn't follow that I go to jail in every country. All that follows is:
(4) Therefore, I eat cereal tomorrow in the actual world.
It's just like the country/murder/jail case. And this conclusion is compatible with free will. Even though I will eat cereal tomorrow, nevertheless I could do otherwise. There are many possible worlds in which I do otherwise. It just so happens that in the actual world, I won't. But that's no threat to free will.
And now you can see why that argument from (1)-(3) is fallacious. And so this argument doesn't give us a reason to think that God's foreknowledge eliminates our freedom.
EMAIL THIS PAGE
PRINT
RSS
Comments
I follow your logic & agree. It also seems to me, though, that the fact that God is outside of time and we operate IN time reconciles foreknowledge and freewill. God knows what we are going to do because in His omniscience we have already done it. His knowledge of our actions prior to us doing them does not cause them to happen.
Uh, did I just repeat what you said?
>>It also seems to me, though, that the fact that God is outside of time and we operate IN time reconciles foreknowledge and freewill.>>
Maybe. I just have a lot of trouble understanding what it means to be "outside" of time. So I have trouble seeing how this reconciles foreknowledge and free will.
>>God knows what we are going to do because in His omniscience we have already done it. His knowledge of our actions prior to us doing them does not cause them to happen. >>
I agree that foreknowing isn't forecausing. But the objector isn't saying anything about causing. He's just saying that, if God knows what I will do now, before I do it, and if God can't be wrong, then I'm not really free.
How does talking about God being outside of time help? Isn't it still true that now, God knows what I will do tomorrow? And isn't it still true that God can't be wrong?
>>I agree that foreknowing isn't forecausing. But the objector isn't saying anything about causing. He's just saying that, if God knows what I will do now, before I do it, and if God can't be wrong, then I'm not really free. <<
That is exactly where God being outside of time helps. There is no "before" or "after" with God. He created time for our benefit, but is not bound by it. So, does God know what I WILL do or has He already seen what I HAVE done?
>>There is no "before" or "after" with God.>>
Didn't God create me after he created Moses? Didn't God free the Israelites from slavery before he became incarnate as Jesus?
>>He created time for our benefit, but is not bound by it.>>
What is it like "outside" of time? That's the part I don't understand.
>>So, does God know what I WILL do or has He already seen what I HAVE done?>>
I think God knows what I will do. Right now, God knows exactly what day I will die on, exactly how many children I will have, etc. He knows these propositions about the future. Some people think this means I don't have free will.
Trying to express my thoughts succinctly often results in lack of clarity -- I apologize.
Let me try this again, or better yet, let C.S. Lewis explain it:
"If you picture Time as a straight line along which we have to travel, then you must picture God as the whole page on which the line is drawn. We come to the parts of the line one by one: we have to leave A behind before we get to B, and cannot reach C until we leave B behind. God, from above or outside or all around, contains the whole line , and sees it all."
And this:
"Everyone who believes in God at all believes that He knows what you and I are going to do tomorrow. But if He knows I am going to do so-and-so, how can I be free to do otherwise? Well, here once again, the difficulty comes from thinking that God is progressing along the Time-line like us: the only difference being that He can see ahead and we cannot. Well, if that were true, if God foresaw our acts, it would be very hard to understand how we could be free not to do them. But suppose God is outside and above the Time-line. In that case, what we call "tomorrow" is visible to Him in just the same way as what we call "today." All the days are "Now" for Him. He does not remember you doing things yesterday; He simply sees you doing them, because, though you have lost yesterday, He has not. He does not "foresee" you doing things tomorrow; He simply sees you doing them: because, though tomorrow is not yet there for you, it is for Him. You never suppose that your actions at this moment were any less free because God knows what you are doing. Well, He knows your tomorrow's actions in just the same way -- because He is already in tomorrow and can simply watch you. In a sense, He does not know your action till you have done it: but then the moment at which you have done it is already "Now" for Him."
from MERE CHRISTIANITY
I read this book as a young teenager, and haven't picked it up again until now, but that concept has stuck with me all these years (I won't tell you exactly how many!). It's the only part I do remember, so I think I'm going to reread the whole book now. Thanks for bringing it to mind!
Hi just curious,
Thanks for the reply. I have read Lewis' view on this. As I understand it, it is a version of Boethius' view, which you can find in "The Consolation of Philosophy."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consolation_of_Philosophy
I'm afraid the metaphors don't totally help me though. Let me put the worry this way:
Right now, does God know what I will do tomorrow?
If yes, then I don't see how Boethius'/Lewis' way out helps here, since they both grant the objector's main premise.
If no, then it sure looks like God doesn't have foreknowledge.
You said "(1)In every possible world, if God believes p, then p is true.
(2) God believes that I will eat cereal tomorrow in the actual world.
(3) Therefore, I eat cereal tomorrow in every possible world.
But clearly (3) doesn't follow, just as it didn't follow that I go to jail in every country. All that follows is:
(4) Therefore, I eat cereal tomorrow in the actual world.
Perhaps I am a bit naive in the realm of philosophy, but I am really not following the line of thinking here. I think that I followed the rest of your blog just fine, but what is the deal with "every possible world"? From what I understand, we all live and dwell in the same world. If God believes that I will eat cereal tomorrow, it will indeed happen.
Can you help me to understand this possible vs. actual world scenario you set up here? Thanks
Phil
Hi Phil,
One of my goals in this blog is to keep the jargon out. But you're right to point out that I've failed, and I'll try to correct it now. :-)
You said:
>>what is the deal with "every possible world"? From what I understand, we all live and dwell in the same world.>>
Philosophers speak of "possible worlds" since it creates useful imagery in order to talk about possibility and necessity. Imagine God before creation, looking out before at all the worlds he could create, sitting there on his workbench so to speak. Some worlds include me, some don't. Some include unicorns and golden mountains, others don't. None include square-circles or people taller than themselves. All of them include the number 4, etc.
So when philosophers say "There is a possible world in which..." they just mean "Possibly..." And if they say "There is no possible world in which..." they just mean "It's not possible that..." And if they say "In every possible world..." they just mean "Necessarily..."
Possible worlds are a useful heuristic device. They help us understand, visualize, and talk about possibility and necessity.
Does that help?
>>If God believes that I will eat cereal tomorrow, it will indeed happen.>>
I agree. If God believes that I will do X tomorrow, then I will. But that's not an objection to free will. What's incompatible with free will is the claim that I MUST do X tomorrow. "In every possible world," I do X tomorrow. But that doesn't follow from the premises.
Tamb,
Thanks for the clarification. Although this helps to make sense of what we are speaking of when talking about possibility, obviously God only created one world, and so in this created reality in which we live, if God knows something to be true, then it is not possible for us to do otherwise (if we assume perfect knowledge and foreknowledge of God).
I see the attempt to get around the possibility that God can know and yet not determine what happens, however I find this argument from possible worlds less than convincing. My reasoning follows. Even if there are any number of possible worlds that God could have chosen to create, when he finally chose to create the one he did, he could see what would happen in this world, thus making it so. We are not able to override God's choice of possibility, and choose a different possible world to live and dwell in, thus while we "feel" that we have choice in your scenario, in reality it is already determined.
phil
Hi Phil,
Thanks for the reply. Here are some comments I had:
You said:
>>obviously God only created one world, and so in this created reality in which we live, if God knows something to be true, then it is not possible for us to do otherwise (if we assume perfect knowledge and foreknowledge of God).>>
This is the inference I'm challenging. I don't think it follows at all. What follows is only that I will do as God foreknows. Not that I must.
This is the fallacious inference I pointed out in my post:
(1) Necessarily, if God believes p, then p is true. (def. of omniscience)
(2) God believes I will mow the lawn tomorrow. (stipulation)
(3) Therefore, I must mow the lawn tomorrow.
That's a modal fallacy, and I tried to explain why in my last blog.
If you're not making that (bad) argument, which argument are you making?
You say this:
>>Even if there are any number of possible worlds that God could have chosen to create, when he finally chose to create the one he did, he could see what would happen in this world, thus making it so.>>
I agree with everything you've said there. But you go on:
>>We are not able to override God's choice of possibility, and choose a different possible world to live and dwell in, thus while we "feel" that we have choice in your scenario, in reality it is already determined.>>
Yeah, that's the part that I don't think follows. God has chosen which of the possible worlds to make actual. Sure. Given that he chose a world in which I mow the lawn tomorrow, it follows that I will mow the lawn tomorrow. It does NOT follow that I must mow the lawn tomorrow. There are many possible worlds just like this one up until tomorrow in which I refrain from mowing the lawn. So I can do otherwise. So it's not the case that I must mow the lawn.