Whoever murdered George Tiller has done a gravely wicked thing. …No private individual had the right to execute judgment against him. For the sake of justice and right, the perpetrator of this evil deed must be prosecuted, convicted and punished. …Every human life is precious. George Tiller’s life was precious. We do not teach the wrongness of taking human life by wrongfully taking a human life. My point is simply to raise some troubling questions about the justification that has been offered for why the killing of Dr. Tiller should be condemned. My criticism will be applied to both the right and the left. Last night on the O’Reilly Factor, Bill O’Reilly strongly condemned the killing of Dr. Tiller. Even though O’Reilly has been an outspoken critic of Tiller, he strongly condemned his murder. While I agree that the murder of Tiller should be strongly condemned, O’Reilly’s justification was troubling and unconvincing. He said, “Clear thinking Americans should condemn the killing of Dr. Tiller because what he did was within the bounds of Kansas law.” In other words, while Dr. Tiller’s actions were deeply immoral, murdering him was wrong because it is illegal. This raises a troubling question and an inconsistency in O’Reilly’s justification. After all, weren’t Nazi atrocities “within the bounds” of German law? Would O’Reilly have condemned the killing of Hitler, had he been assassinated, even though what Hitler did was fully legal by the German law of his time? The power of the recent movie Valkyrie is that sometimes it is right to go against the legal code of a society for the greater good. Why would it be right to kill Hitler, who directed the deaths of 6 million Jews, but not Tiller who personally killed 60,000 fully viable members of the human community through late-term abortions? You might be thinking, “But our laws do not give full human rights to the unborn ‘fetus.’ It’s not considered a full human person.” But the same was true for Germany. They intentionally avoided terms such as “human” and “person” when talking about Jews. Rather, they referred to them as “vermin” that needed to be exterminated. While the society considered them less than fully human, the reality is that Jews were fully human and deserving of life. On what basis can we deny full human rights to an unborn child in late term any more than we can deny it to the Jews? There is no convincing scientific, philosophical, or theological reason to deny them from full status as members of the human community. Here’s the bottom line: just because something is legal does not mean its right (slavery also comes to mind). And just because something is illegal does not necessarily mean it is wrong. While the killing of Tiller ought to be condemned, O’Reilly and others who base their arguments on its legality need a better moral justification. But there is also an inconsistency on the side of the left. President Obama harshly criticizes torture, even though it arguably has resulted in the saving of human lives. In other words, the ends do not justify the means. However, oddly enough, Obama also favors the bombing of Pakistan for the end result of saving American. The problem is that these actions result in the death of many innocent Pakistanis. Why is it okay to kill innocent Pakistani civilians, but not okay to torture (probably) guilty terror suspects who are not killed? Here’s my question as it relates to the killing of Dr. Tiller: If it is not acceptable to kill an abortionist, why is it okay to kill innocent civilians in Pakistan since both have the end goal of saving lives?” From my perspective, the only justifiable reason for protecting human life (whether the unborn or Dr. Tiller’s) is that human beings are made in the image of God and thus have infinite dignity, value, and worth. Neither the left nor the right can give a solid foundation for intrinsic human value without God. Rather than Dr. Tiller getting what he (allegedly) deserved, could it be that our culture, which has abandoned the real basis of human dignity, got what it deserved? |

EMAIL THIS PAGE
PRINT
RSS









Comments
Sean, your last paragraph doesn't answer the questions you raise. Suppose that we grant that human beings are made in the image of God. How does this help you answer your own question: If it is morally impermissible to kill the Dr. Tiller (because Dr. Tiller is "made in the image of God"), is it ever permissible to kill anyone? If so, then why, and under what conditions?
Instead of addressing these questions, you suddenly assert, "From my perspective, the only justifiable reason for protecting human life (whether the unborn or Dr. Tiller’s) is that human beings are made in the image of God." Not only is this assertion disconnected from your previous line of inquiry, it is also weird. Your statement presumably means that if you lost faith in God, you would find yourself without any reason to protect the innocent from being murdered. This speaks wonders of your character, and I'm sure it is of great comfort to your loved ones.
While I would agree with this comment that I was also left wondering on your (Mr. McDowell's) stance on whether it is "ever permissible to kill anyone? If so, then why, and under what conditions?" I do believe that needed answering if you claim that "The power of the recent movie Valkyrie is that sometimes it is right to go against the legal code of a society for the greater good." By this quote you are claiming that it was right to attempt to assassinate a person for the "greater good" yet in your last paragraph you state that humans are of "infinite value". My question would be where you would say killing was justified?
However, I would assert that Mr. McDowell is correct that "the only justifiable reason for protecting human life (whether the unborn or Dr. Tiller’s) is that human beings are made in the image of God." I would challenge whoever made this comment claiming that this is a false claim to come up with another valid reason. The only one that springs to mind is legality and if you can get away with it, there is no logical reason not to kill someone. But I do want to point out that I am not claiming a belief in God is necessary to value human rights, I just think the valuing of human rights would not be logically founded in anything. (I believe Mr. McDowell is of this same opinion)
Guest, you miss my point. My point was not to develop when it is okay and when it is not okay to take human life, but to show the weaknesses in reasons that are given (by both sides) for not taking Dr. Tiller's life. I believe there are times in which it is justified to take life (war, self-defense, capital punishment, etc...).
Also, you confused my argument about God providing the only sufficient explanation for intrinsic human dignity. My point had NOTHING to do with whether one believes in God or not (epistemology). This is irrelevant. The question is whether in fact we are made in God's image (metaphysics). Apart from the imago dei, it's difficult (if not, impossible) to find a valid and consistent basis for human worth. People who don't believe in God don't necessarily lose their respect for human life (after all, they are still made in God's image). They just lack a sufficient grounding for these beliefs.
Sean, you claim that "people who don't believe in God...lack a sufficient grounding for ['their respect for human life']." You maintain that an unbeliever wouldn't be able to offer any "justifiable reason for protecting human life." You therefore suppose that, if you lost faith in God, you would "lack a sufficient grounding" for respecting/protecting human life." This speaks poorly of either your judgment or your character.
Suppose we encountered someone who sees a young, unattended child about to stray onto the busy highway. This person fully realizes that if he does not help that child, the child will likely be hit by a car--and that helping the child would be a very easy thing to do. Do you really think that the question of whether or not this person should help the young child depends upon whether or not there is a God? I think that most non-fundamentalists would agree that the fact that this person could save the child from serious injury/death at very little cost to himself is itself a sufficient reason to respond.
Let's bring this closer to home. If you suddenly discovered that God didn't exist, would you find yourself without any reason to look after the health and well-being of your child? If your own child still needs you, I hope for his/her sake that you keep the faith. But better: if your own child is about to be gravely injured by traffic, I hope that you realize that the fact that you could easily rescue him/her is itself a sufficient reason to respond. There is something wrong with you if you require additional reasons.
Reader, thanks for your comments. But you misunderstand my reasoning. Your example of the young, unattended child (although interesting) misses the point. You say, "Do you really think that the question of whether or not this person should help the young child depends upon whether or not there is a God?" My answer is YES, the existence of God has everything to do with it. If this is merely an accidental universe without any plan or purpose, then on what moral basis ought I save the child? Why does that child--if it is the result of a blind, material, accidental process--have any more intrinsic value than a piece of wood that may also be in the middle of the road? I agree that non "fundamentalists" believe that the child ought to be saved. But what I am looking for is a metaphysical basis for why a human being is the type of thing that has intrinsic value in a godless world. Attacking me and my character does not answer the question.
Sean, you could clarify your position by answering the following questions:
(1) At very little cost to yourself, you could save the child from serious injury. Why is this not by itself a sufficient reason to act?
(2) Your own child will suffer painful and permanent harm if you do not warn him/her about the oncoming truck. Though you acknowledge this, you fail to see that it is a sufficient reason to warn her about the oncoming truck. How does this not reflect poorly upon your judgment and/or character as a father?
@reader
(1) According Sean's post, a human is defined as a being created in the image of God and of intrinsic value. Without belief in God the definition of a human is undefined so at a very little cost to yourself, saving a child is the equivalent of investing in a flabrigaff. Reader, would you pay for a flabrigaff at a minimal cost?
Eric MacLeod,
Show me a flabrigaff and I'll let you know. Most of us are acquainted with children and we recognize that they ought to be rescued from serious injury, other things being equal. Why must this recognition, or the judgment itself, rest upon any theologically loaded definition of "human being"?
Now here's a riddle for you. Most of us can distinguish certain activities as games, but few if any can provide a satisfactory definition of "game." Without a definition of "game" would you concede that every game is just as dangerous as eating an X (where the denotation of "X" is unknown to you)? Can you see the parallel?
I see the parallel in the riddle and I am unsure if it would be more dangerous to play any game than to ingest X; the terms are too vague. It is my hope that people would save children regardless of their theological inclinations.
I believe that properly defining morality is better than trusting an emotive sense of ought. Emotions can at times be unreliable...I know mine are. If the decision to preserve human life is determined solely by a sense of ought, than it is more likely to be compromised by self-interest.
Who said anything about "an emotive sense of ought"?
"Most of us are acquainted with children and we recognize that they ought to be rescued"
I guess I was trying to understand this statement. It sounds right, but I inferred as to the source of "ought". I hope I did not misrepresent what you are trying to say here. Could you elaborate?
The "source of 'ought'" is simply the fact that you could, at little cost, save the child from severe harm. This fact alone grounds the proposition that you ought to rescue the child. The truth of that proposition is independent of any emotions you happen to feel. That is, you still ought to rescue the child even if you lack the expected emotions. I assume you agree.
Hopefully this can be resolved before the
<<< indent eats up all the space.
Without a belief in God, I am assuming that the preservation of the self is of primary importance. As soon as a cost is introduced—great or little—then the cost should be less than, or equal to that value of the goods purchased; in this case the life of a child. If the child is worthless, what does is profit you—and how can it be reasonable—to save the life of the child?
"Without a belief in God, I am assuming that the preservation of the self is of primary importance."
There is no reason, as far as I can see, to assume this. Why assume this?
Okay. It can be observed that people generally take care of themselves—and thereby place importance in the self—regardless of their theological inclinations. How is the self importance set aside without a belief in God?
You may be right about what people generally do. However, you shouldn't equate what people have reason to do with what people generally do. Moreover, if you can concede "the importance of the self" in the absence of God, why can't you concede the importance of others in the absence of God?
Sorry, I got a bit ahead of myself; I presumed the atheist position to be Social Darwinism that requires competition. I would not want to place myself in an untenable position of conceding anything to have importance without God, so you can see where I'm coming from. I guess it would be fairer to ask what position you're coming from?
Eric, thank you for your candor. I am coming from the position that the following fact provides a sufficient reason to help a child: that one can prevent the child from serious harm at very little cost to oneself. I take this judgment (that such a fact provides such a reason) to be more secure/trustworthy than any of the various theories about reasons and value that philosophers and theologians have constructed. Such theories are rather to be assessed in light of the more particular judgments such as the one I have offered.
Those, such as Sean McDowell, who deny that such a fact (again: that one can prevent the child from serious harm at very little cost to oneself) constitutes a sufficient reason to help the child should explain their denial. To me, it looks suspiciously as if a some screwy theory or theoretical agenda has undermined good judgment. I have yet to come across any theory about value/reasons that is more plausible than the particular judgment which such people are seeking to deny.
It is perplexing, and seemingly contradictory, that many people would save the unattended child regardless of having sufficient reason (i.e. belief in God, and thereby affirming intrinsic human value). How can this be accounted for?
What about love and compassion for our fellow human beings? An enjoyment of their company, and indeed, a need and longing for it independent of belief in god....seeing them prosper, laugh, and succeed. Is this not sufficient reason?
"Why does that child--if it is the result of a blind, material, accidental process--have any more intrinsic value than a piece of wood that may also be in the middle of the road?"
Because we, as human beings, individually decide what we value and what we don't. However, the social nature of our brains throws an interesting slant...our social needs and predilections usually put the child as more valuable to us than the piece of wood. But not all of us!
"I agree that non "fundamentalists" believe that the child ought to be saved. But what I am looking for is a metaphysical basis for why a human being is the type of thing that has intrinsic value in a godless world."
Well, if you're only looking for a metaphysical basis then you're not nearly as interested in answering the question as you say. If you really want to know why humans have intrinsic value to other humans in a godless world, there's far more to it than metaphysics.
I think the title of this post is misleading, and left unanswered. Sean, I'd encourage you to avoid titling blogs with shocking, yet irrelevant headlines. It may drive up the traffic, but it leaves readers frustrated. I think a more appropriate title could be "Why was Tiller's murder evil?"
I may want to believe that even though the gunman was wrong in murdering Tiller, Tiller still got what he deserved based on some divine system of weights and balances, but I don't think that accords with Scripture.
I liked the article. It's a question of worldview. That's what Sean is all about.